BRAZILIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, IT’S FEDERALISM AND INEFFICIENCY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY by Konrad, Júlio Freitas et al.
  
 
3 
BRAZILIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, IT’S FEDERALISM 
AND INEFFICIENCY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
_____ 
 
Julio Freitas Konrad1 
Marcelo De Sa Mendes2 
Marina Gondin Ramos3 
Ronaldo Neves De Moura Filho4 
 
Brazil has a specific kind of bottom-up federalism which public power is located in 
the autonomy of the free individuals. As DELLAVALLE5 argues: 
In Hobbes’s vision, power is ascending to the extent that it is no longer seen as an 
element that the given political authority deduces from divine law or from its own alleged 
natural superiority. Rather, it arises from the original freedom and independence of 
individuals, who create the sovereign authority by an act of free will, i.e., by transferring 
their rights to the newly established public power in order to ensure an adequate protection 
of the individual entitlements on the basis of the legitimacy emanating from the same 
fundament of social order. 
 Brazilian federalism was institutionalized by the 1891 Constitution, inspired by 
United States federalism, however it is far more centralized than it is in Canada or in the 
United States. It was very important to maintain its national unity. In this sense, ROSENN6 
when explaining the adoption of federalism in Brazil argues that 
Brazil did not adopt federalism for the traditional reasons of uniting polities that had 
previously been sovereign entities, nor as a device to govern different ethnic, linguistic, or 
religious groups. Indeed, there was no serious bargaining among the members of the 
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federation about its future characteristics; the virtually powerless former provinces were 
simply converted into quasi-sovereign states, first by military fiat and later by the 1891 
Constitution. The Brazilians adopted federalism as a reaction against the Empire's 
authoritarian, heavily centralized rule in a country with enormous size and distinct regions 
with quite different traditions. 
Moreover, the 1988 Constitution which remains valid and represents the New 
Republic in Brazil, guarantees to the states only powers that are not forbidden to them. It 
is not granted any exclusive power to the states themselves. Some of them are established 
by concurrent powers7. This explains why the authority of federal government is so 
extensive and centralized. 
In such a big country like Brazil, the most difficult challenge is to maintain a fair 
balance between the resources and responsibilities of the federal, state and local 
government. Brazilian federalism centralizes too much of the resource at a federal level and 
decentralizes responsibilities to the states and local levels, implicating in a lack of material 
resources.  
The first conclusion is the fact that the Brazilian state is not efficient as it should be 
once the state and local government don´t have enough material and funding resource to 
build and develop a public policy themselves. It happens because the Constitution don´t 
established the power or authority necessary for state and local government and also 
because they don´t have the necessary budgetary resources.  
There is no doubt that government at local and state levels is responsible for many 
assignments that directly interferes in any citizen daily life, such as: public health, basic 
education, public transportation and public security, among others. However, such policies 
always need a high budget, along with strategic and coordinated action with the federal 
government, which most of the time they are not able to do it. 
Ribeiro8 analyzing a public health policy in the context of Brazilian federalism 
concluded that 
Brazil’s centralized federal system does not produce strong coordination of health 
policy at local level. The competitive aspect of federalism at the subnational level and 
socioeconomic factors highlighted in the specialized literature represent stiff obstacles to 
the effectiveness of redistributive policies and should be the subject of in-depth research 
as should the failures of state government coordination. 
This entire context is even worse because the 1988 Constitution ensures a 
declaration of individual rights and establishes a proper welfare state in a country with high 
social inequality, making the challenge even more difficult. Therefore, there is no efficiency 
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delivered to public policies and many controversial constitutional problems are addressed 
to lawsuits and constitutional acts overloading the Judiciary.  
The complexity of the Brazilian federalism responsibilities – fundamental rights, 
public health and education policies, environmental protection or indigenous lands – leads 
to the judicialization of political and social relationships. Most of them are caused by the 
fact that there is no clear position which level of government would have the responsibility 
or must pay the cost of their implementation. 
The problem to deliver public policies in such a big country like Brazil is a federalism 
challenge. Decentralizing power and providing material resources to state and local levels 
would enable them to delivery their own public policies. As they are closer to the people, 
they would be able to satisfy the deepest wishes of its people.  
 
Comparative studies on public expenditure and Government Effectiveness 
As countries struggle to find balance between a centralized model of public policy 
or to decentralize state power into a federalist model that distribute some of the power 
and resources to local governments, the discussion should include the quality of 
government spending, since the argument of the size of the state relative to the national 
economy do not provide a clear answer to this issue. 
For instance, the size of the government revenue from the economy doesn’t always 
reflects clearly in public spending. In data from the IMF, in 2011, the Brazilian government 
revenue represented 35.01% of the Gross Domestic Product, and United States stood 
behind with its revenue taking 31.39% of its GDP and Chile lagging way behind, with a 
smaller government footprint of 24.72% of the GDP, like shown in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1 
 
Although the size of government impacts deeply in the perception of the burden the 
state represents in the population, the way governments spend this money is the way 
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society have to correct some inevitable market flaws. But in the side of expenditure, United 
States uses 41.45% of its GDP, Brazil 37.63% and Chile 23.30% in its programs (Figure 2). It 
shows inefficiency both in Brazil and US, constantly increasing their debt: 
Figure 2 
 
Figure 3 
 
Figure 3 shows the public debt in percent of the GDP, and since it skyrocket in the 
1940’s and 1980’s, Chile adopted a responsible fiscal approach to its public debt and is 
today, comfortably, sits in 11.25% of the GDP. US and Brazil are now around 102.93% and 
64.94% in debt, respectively. The size of the debt and the way government spent tax money 
reflect directedly in the interests paid for its public debts (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4 
 
 Other factors affect the public perception of state efficiency, amongst them, 
corruption is of uttermost importance for the trust of a population on its rulers, and by 
inference, in their perception of state effectiveness, as said by Delavallade9: 
In all countries, and more noticeably in developing countries, corruption is 
detrimental to state efficiency. It hampers budget equilibrium, diminishes expenditure 
efficiency and distorts its allocation between different budgetary functions. 
Its also stated by Delavallade that Chile is the least corrupt developing country. The 
sum of responsible spending, low impact in the economy, and control in corruption 
translates to the better perception of Government Effectiveness by the population. This 
indicator puts Brazil, with all its 37% of GDP expenditure, with 41.83% of Government 
Effectiveness, against 77.88% from Chile and 92.79% from the United States. 
 
Conclusion 
In his work Political order and political decay Fukuyama10 assures that institutions 
were the products of contingent historical circumstances and accidents that are unlikely to 
be duplicated by other differently situated societies. 
Brazilian institutions are not an exception to this. As commented above there is a 
long and complex causal chain that resulted in the present frame of federalism and its 
division of competences. 
More than this recognition Fukuyama’s insight is a word of caution about simplistic 
solutions to the challenges faced by any country in the world. This means that improving 
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our federalism and so the level of our public policies cannot be achieved by copying 
solutions built in developed countries for example.  
Starting from a comprehensive international benchmark could be a way to find new 
paths toward desirable outcomes. Even a simple comparison as that above explained brings 
unexpected possibilities. Comparisons between countries that face similar problems could 
be undoubtedly useful. However, it is never enough.  
The success to any change in a country’s institutional structure has to be found in a 
deep understanding of its own history and characteristics. Besides it is necessary a solid 
commitment between society and the political and bureaucratic structures. A non-
functional federalism blocks a full commitment at least for the lack of representation. When 
this kind of disbalance is accompanied by clientelism and corruption the way towards a 
better scenario is more uncertain.  
This is the reason why solutions to Brazilian problems are not quite simple. 
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